This paper analyses wage dynamics at individual level using the European Community Household Panel data. We compare yearly wage changes of full-time employees staying in the same …rm for twelve European countries during the 1994-96 time-period. For all the European countries we …nd evidence of nominal wage rigidity. The percentage of employees receiving no wage changes is di¤erent across countries, with Germany and Ireland ranking at the top and the bottom respectively. At the same time, nominal wage cuts are not rare. We therefore consider the impact of the bargaining structure and institutions in the European labor markets on the extent of nominal wage ‡exibility observed.
Introduction
It is commonly recognized that the extent of nominal wage ‡exibility is an important determinant of how the economy responds to nominal demand shocks. Nonetheless, very little is known about the empirical causes of nominal wage ‡exibility. The objective of this paper is thus twofold. First we measure the extent of nominal wage ‡exibility at individual level in twelve EU countries: UK, Italy, France, Germany, Denmark, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal. Second, we carry out comparisons across countries using country-speci…c institutional variables for explaining the extent of the observed frequencies of wage cuts.
While the existing microeconometric studies on nominal wage ‡exibility, carried out initially for the US and recently for some European countries, focus on the relationship between in ‡ation and wage ‡exibility 1 , there is no attempt of systematic comparisons of nominal wage changes distributions across countries, nor any empirical evaluation of how nominal wage ‡exibility is a¤ected by labor market institutions. On the other hand, the existing literature about the relationship between macroeconomic performance and collective bargaining is mainly focused on the impact of institutional variables on the rate of unemployment 2 , failing to address the e¤ects on individual wage changes.
In this paper we try to link these two approaches, analyzing the relationship between nominal wage ‡exibility and institutions using for the …rst time data at individual level. In the …rst part of our analysis we adopt a framework similar to that of previous microeconometric studies on wage ‡exibility. For each country we construct nominal wage changes distributions for stayers full-time, and then we compare, across countries, the extent of downward wage ‡exibility, de…ned as the frequency of wage cuts, and the extent of wage rigidity, de…ned as the frequency of zero wage changes. The data set used is the recently released 1994-1996 waves of the European Community Household Panel (ECHP). A unique feature of this data-set is that the same questionnaire is asked in all the countries involved in the survey, making cross-country comparisons particularly easy and reliable.
In the second part of the paper the frequencies of wage cuts are stacked by country into a single variable and regressed on a set of institutional variables typically used in the macroeconomic performance literature 3 , thus trying to explain nominal wage ‡exibility with country-speci…c institutional characteristics.
Our …ndings are the following:
² although nominal wage changes distributions from the ECHP have different shapes across the European countries, in each country a spike is observed at zero nominal wage changes, and wages are not completely downwardly rigid;
² the extent of the spike at zero is di¤erent across countries, with Germany and Ireland ranking at the top and the bottom respectively;
² nominal wage ‡exibility has a U-shaped relationship with some measures of centralization and coordination of bargaining, and positive correlation with coverage.
The structure of the paper is the following: in Section 2 we brie ‡y survey previous results existing in the literature; Section 3 describes the ECHP data and the information available about employees and wages. Section 4 contains the results of our analysis. In Section 5 we use institutional variables for explaining the extent of nominal wage ‡exibility observed. Section 6 summarizes our conclusions.
Related literature
The interest in analyzing individual panel data in order to assess whether wages are rigid or ‡exible dates back to McLaughlin (1994)'s paper. From that date on, a number of similar analyses have been carried out both for the US and some European Countries. There is no agreement among researchers about the extent of downward wage rigidity even for the US, where most of the analyses have been carried out using the same data-set, the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID). Intercountry comparisons are di¢cult because surveys are collected according to di¤erent criteria, and therefore the information available both for de…ning the subsample and the variable of interest may di¤er across countries.
The existing evidence from individual surveys seems to support the idea that wages are rigid in nominal, but not in real terms. It is not clear, however, the extent of downward nominal wage rigidity at individual level. Using data from the PSID, McLaughlin (1994) …nds that on average over 1976-86 there were 17% stayers experiencing nominal wage cuts and 7% had zero nominal pay growth. He uses two measures: earnings and hourly earnings concluding that wages in the US are quite ‡exible.
Instead of pooling together periods of high and low in ‡ation, subsequent studies have focused on yearly wage changes, …nding evidence of a spike at zero in the distribution of nominal wage changes. This spike is taken as evidence of nominal wage rigidity. But, although being quite asymmetric around zero, wage changes distributions are not completely downwardly rigid. Kahn (1997) distinguishes between 10.6% wage cuts for wage earners and 24.3% cuts for salary earners, …nding also a strong evidence of 8% nominal wage rigidity during 1971-88. Also, according to Card and Hyslop (1997) , despite many individuals in the PSID report wage cuts, there is clear evidence of nominal wage rigidity. In particular, they …nd that the spike at zero hourly wage changes spans from 7% in a 10% in ‡ation environment to 15% when in ‡ation fell to 5%, both for salary and wage earners. Therefore, the spike at zero nominal wage changes is highly sensitive to the rate of in ‡ation.
Data at …rm level (Altonji and Devereux (2000)'s personnel …le of a large …rm, Bewley (1998)'s interview study that involves 300 business people) show much higher levels of wage rigidity, measured as hourly wage, and basically no wage cuts. Using di¤erent methodologies, McLaughlin (1994) , and Card and Hyslop (1997) argue that measurement errors can not explain all the percentages of wage cuts observed in individual survey's data, whereas by estimating an econometric model Altonji and Devereux (2000) explain all the wage cuts observed in the PSID with measurement error. Therefore, in the PSID, measurement errors apparently reduce the observed percentage of nominal wage rigidity and increase the percentage of wage cuts.
Similar analyses carried out in some European countries seem to give different results. Goux (1997) , and Biscourp, Dessy, Fourcade (2004) compare two di¤erent sources of data available for France: the 1976-92 Déclarations Annuelles de Donnèe Sociales (DADS), an administrative, potentially errorfree data-set, and the 1990-96 French Labor Force Survey (LFS). Using annual earnings as a measure of wages, and therefore not controlling for the number of hours, they …nd that the amount of wage cuts is similar in the two data-sets and a¤ects approximately 25% of stayers employed full-time 4 . Smith (1999) and Nickell and Quintini (2001) examine the UK using di¤erent data sources. Smith (2000) analyses the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). She uses weekly earnings as a measure for wages and stayers who do not change the number of hours worked as the sample of interest. She …nds that the percentage of employees whose wage is constant from one year to the next is 9% during 1991-6 and the percentage of wage cuts is on average 23%. Using the unique feature of the BHPS that allows to consider the subsample of people whose payslip has been checked by the interviewer, Smith (1999) focuses on the employees whose reported earnings are errorfree, and who do not receive bonuses or overtime pay, …nding that only 1% of them had zero pay growth and 18% received wage cuts. Therefore, contrary to what has been found for the US, measurement errors seem to be the main source of wage rigidity, increasing the percentage of nominal wage rigidity observed in survey data. As a consequence wages appear much more ‡exible in the UK than in the US. Using the UK New Earnings Survey (NES) from 1997 to 1999, Nickell and Quintini (2001) …nd on average lower percentages of both no change in wage and wage cuts than Smith (2000) for the same 1991-96 period, but they use a di¤erent measure of wage. In the NES data are provided by employers and come directly from payroll records, which ensures a high degree of accuracy. The measure of the nominal hourly wage rate used is the weekly pay of those whose pay is una¤ected by absence, excluding overtime pay, divided by weekly hours excluding overtime hours. Again, only full-time employees not changing job are considered. Fehr and Goette (1999) analyze earnings per working hour of stayers in the Swiss LFS during the period of very low in ‡ation 1991-96. They …nd 12% of rigid wages and 25% of wage cuts. Allowing for measurement errors they estimate Altonji and Devereux (2000)'s econometric model obtaining results similar to those found for the US: measurement errors can explain most of the observed wag cuts, that actually turn in no wage changes.
Data
The European Community Household Panel (ECHP) is a recent large-scale longitudinal study set up and funded by the European Union. The great advantage of the ECHP is that it is a survey in which information is given not only at household, but also at individual level. Moreover, the same questionnaire is asked to a sample of about 60,000 nationally representative households -i.e. approximately 129,000 adults aged 16 years and over -in 12 European countries (UK, Italy, France, Germany, Denmark, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal). This procedure allows us to compare directly data from di¤erent countries, reducing the problems of harmonizing di¤erent countries information. In this paper we use the …rst three waves released by Eurostat, that cover the years 1994-1996 5 . In 1995 Austria joined the project and in 1996 Finland too, therefore the number of Member States raised to 14.
The user-friendly, anonymised version of the ECHP, sold by Eurostat, is called User Data Base (UDB). In the UDB data have been anonymised and checked as thoroughly as possible, and some imputations have been carried out. This version of the data-set turns out to be very 'clean', but it contains less information than the original data, the so-called Production Data Base (PDB) 6 . To facilitate comparisons with previous studies we concentrate on employees, excluding self-employed from our analysis. Employees are detected in the ECHP as people reporting wages. The sample we are interested in is composed of stayers, i.e. employees who do not change job and …rm 7 . Unfortunately we can not distinguish employees paid by the hour from those paid weekly. But we have quite detailed information about the type of the employment contract. In particular, we know whether the employee is working part-time or full-time 8 . In Tab. 1 we give the composition of stayers in the ECHP by contract characteristics. We consider only the sub-sample of stayers full-time. As we can see, they are the majority in our sample. Although most of the previous analyses in this …eld of research focused on the private sector, we consider the public and private sectors together, as wages in the two sectors turn out to be highly correlated in all the European countries.
Even though in the original questionnaire both net and gross wages were asked, in the UDB version we …nd only information about net wages 9 . The only exception is France where, because of the tax system, wage data have been collected as gross. This is not a serious problem for our analysis, since we are interested in percentage changes.
In the ECHP hourly wages are not reported, but two measures of net nominal earnings are available: 1) "current net wage and salary earnings" (i.e. earnings received in the month of the interview); and 2) "total net wage and salary earnings" (referred to the year before the interview). We decided to take the …rst one as the most reliable measure of wages as the number of months which the second is referred to is not reported.
Since the number of "weekly hours worked in the main job" (always in the month in which the interview was taken) are known, it is also possible to calculate "hourly current earnings". Another way of getting closer to a measure of the increase in basic wages, adopted also in Smith (2000), is to study pay growth when there are no hours changes 10 . In section 3, when presenting our results, we will compare therefore three measures of current wage changes: 1) earnings, 2) hourly wages, and 3) earnings for employees who do not change the number of hours worked.
Since all the above measures are referred to the month in which the interview was taken, we eliminate from the sample people who report a positive "number of days of absence from current job during the past 4 weeks" 11 . For the same reason, we checked that comparing two di¤erent months of the year does not bias our results. In the Appendix we also report results for the sample restricted to people whose interview was taken in no more than two months di¤erence in the two years period considered. Due to the characteristics of the survey, in some countries the number of observations drops dramatically, but the qualitative results do not change at all. In order not to loose too many observations, we decided to keep in the sample people who reported their wages in di¤erent months for consecutive interviews.
Nominal and real wage rigidity
For each of the European countries considered we calculate the distributions of one-year nominal wage changes. We approximate the percentage wage change by taking the di¤erences in logs for each individual as follows:
We de…ne nominal wage rigidity as the percentage of observations such that:
Taking the di¤erences in logs allows us to compare nominal with real wage rigidity very easily. In fact, we can de…ne real wage rigidity as the percentage of observations such that:
log w t+1 ¡ log p t+1 ¡ log w t + log p t = 0 log w t+1 ¡ log w t = log p t+1 ¡ log p t Therefore, we can see the extent of real wage rigidity at the rate of in‡ation (calculated as the di¤erence in logs of price levels in two consecutive years) of the distribution of nominal wage changes.
Tab. 2, 3 and 4 report for each country extensive descriptive statistics respectively for distributions of current nominal earnings changes, hours changes and current hourly earnings changes in logs.
In Fig.1a and 2a we plot the histograms of the di¤erences in logs of nominal current earnings for stayers full-time. A vertical line has been inserted at the annual rate of in ‡ation 12 . Frequencies of the histograms at zero give the extent of nominal wage rigidity whereas frequencies at the rate of in ‡ation tells us the extent of real wage rigidity. For scale reasons, and in order to be able to see the centre of the distribution clearly, a the fraction of workers below 5% and above 95% of the distribution have been excluded 13 . Histograms show that in all the European countries nominal wage changes have a prominent spike at zero. We also observe a sharp drop for little wage changes in stayers' distributions, with higher positive changes of wages more likely to occur. Moreover, for most countries, there is clear evidence of downward nominal wage rigidity as the distributions are asymmetric. At the same time, wages are not completely downwardly rigid across the European countries: the percentages of wage cuts reported are quite high. In none of the countries we observe a spike at the rate of in ‡ation: real wage cuts are much more frequent than nominal wage cuts. Nevertheless, for some countries and some years we observe a second spike at/close to the rate of in ‡ation, smaller than the one at zero.
The percentage of employees with no nominal wage changes varies across countries, and graphs in each …gure are presented in decreasing-spike order. But it is important to notice that the bar showing the spike is constructed around zero, therefore includes small positive and negative wage changes. We discuss inter-countries di¤erences referring to …gures from Table 5 , which gives: in the …rst column the number of stayers full-time in the sample for each country, then the percentage of employees reporting cuts, no changes and rises respectively in earnings, hours and hourly wages. In the last column the sample is restricted to the fraction of workers who do not change the number of hours. Their numbers, and changes in earnings are given.
Countries with the highest percentages of zero wage changes are Germany and Belgium, followed by Luxemburg and Italy. Portugal and Denmark have a slightly smaller percentage of wage rigidity, followed by the UK, Netherlands, Greece and France. Countries with the most ‡exible wages turn out to be Spain and Ireland. We can see that results are not di¤erent in the two time-periods considered, except for the UK, Germany and Portugal, where the percentage of wage rigidity decreases considerably in the second timeperiod.
Comparing di¤erent measures for wages, we notice that the ranking of the countries does not change if we consider earnings for all stayers versus earnings of those who do not change the number of hours. Hourly earnings instead are much more ‡exible than earnings, even though the ranking of the countries according to this measure is not very di¤erent. The above results seem to suggest an e¤ect of change in the hours worked on our results. Therefore, also changes in hours are reported.
Comparisons with previous works
In general, we can say that wage changes distributions from the ECHP bear the same features as the distributions constructed from similar panel data in the US. On average the percentages of rigid wages and wage cuts in Europe are not far away from those observed in the US for similar rates of in ‡ation, but there are enormous di¤erences across countries.
The numbers for the UK in the ECHP are di¤erent from Smith (2000)'s results from the BHPS. For the same periods 1994-95 and 1995-96, before controlling for the payslips and therefore correcting rounding errors, Smith (2000) …nds respectively 9.4% and 7.8% wages unchanged and 22.5% and 23.4% wage cuts. Wage dynamics for the UK from the ECHP are quite strange: in Tab. 5 we observe a dramatic drop in the percentage of rigid wage (from 15.23% to 5.67%). Although we have to bear in mind that in the ECHP we observe net wages whereas Smith (2000) analyses gross wages dynamics, we are not aware of any particular institutional change in the UK in that period which can explain such a strange result 14 . At the same time,we notice that the percentages of rigid hourly earnings, 6.61% and 2.23% are very close to the ones found by Nickell and Quintini (2001) . For the same time-periods, Nickell and Quintini (2001) …nd respectively 5.48% and 1.32% rigid hourly wages and 19.47% and 18.20% nominal hourly wage cuts. The fact that our wage cuts are higher, 31.51% and 23.00%, can be a consequence of the fact that we can not eliminate the part of earnings related to overtime hours and bonuses. Nevertheless, it is interesting to notice that the drop in the spike at zero of 4% hourly wages from 1994-95 to 1995-96 is found also in the NES, administrative data.
Comparisons with Goux (1997) for France can be done from the …rst column of Tab.5, where we do not control for the number of hours. She considers gross earnings for full-time workers in the LFS for the same period …nding respectively, in 1994-95 and 1995-96, 11.5% and 12% full-time workers whose earnings did not change and 27% and 28% wage cuts. Our results for France give slightly higher percentages of wage cuts (+3%) and lower percentages of rigid wages (-2%).
Conclusions from results
The spike at zero nominal wage changes seems to be a characteristic of all the distributions of nominal wage changes constructed from surveydata. Two kinds of errors can a¤ect the extent of the percentage of no change in the wage reported by individuals: 1) reporting/rounding errors and 2) measurement errors. The …rst kind of errors are due to the fact that individuals can be imprecise when reporting their earnings. Usually this kind of error is dealt with by using administrative data. Measurement errors instead come from the lack of information about the structure of earnings in surveys, and often also in administrative data. It is usually di¢cult to isolate the contracted hourly wages from total earnings.
At this point, it is not clear which is the direction of the above biases on the extent of the spike at zero, and using the ECHP data we do not have any source of information that can help us in identifying the measure of any of the above kind of errors. Nevertheless, since the survey is carried out according to the same criteria across countries, we can concentrate on intercountry comparisons at this stage.
The di¤erences in the shape of wage changes distributions across countries are really interesting. It is quite clear (and it is con…rmed from the few validation studies for the UK and France coming from administrative data) that nominal wages are not completely downwardly rigid, although the extent of downward ‡exibility of wages is di¤erent across countries. In the next section we try to explain downward wage ‡exibility with institutional characteristics of the European labor markets.
Explaining wage cuts
The analysis of the previous section allows us to construct a panel dataset of the frequencies of wage cuts, no wage changes and wage rises across countries in an e¤ort to explain the di¤erence in the frequencies of wage cuts for stayers full-time across countries. The ranking of the European countries that emerges from our …gures suggests an explanation of di¤erences in wage changes across countries based on country-characteristics of wage bargaining and labor market institutions.
To model the variation in wage- ‡exibility across the European countries we regress the percentages of wage cuts observed on a number of "institutional" variables, taken from di¤erent sources and summarized in Tab. 6.
In the literature there are many measures of centralization, coordination of bargaining, coverage, and employment protection legislation according to which the European countries are characterized and ranked. Centralization describes the locus of the formal structure of wage bargaining. Typically three levels of bargaining are considered:1) centralized or national bargaining, which may cover the whole economy; 2) intermediate bargaining, where unions and employers' associations negotiations cover particular industries or crafts; and 3) decentralized or …rm-level bargaining between unions and management. The ranking of the European countries according to centralization of wage bargaining from the three sources considered (OECD (1997) for the CENTR variable, Boeri, Brugiavini and Calmfors (2001) for CENTRCD, Nickell and Layard (1999) for the CENTRLN variable) are so di¤erent that I try them separately in my regressions. The variable labelled COORD indicates the degree of coordination, and is based on the degree of consensus between the collective bargaining partners. The ranking of the countries according to COORD is taken from OECD (1997). As we can see from Tab. 6, for the percentage of employees covered by collective agreement the two sources considered (OECD (1997), and Cesifo Forum (2001)), give very similar measures, summarized in the variable labelled PCOV1, that we use for our regressions. The strictness of employment protection legislation, captured by the variable EPL, is taken from OECD (1999). We do not consider the percentage of employees belonging to the union in each country as an esplicative variable, because it is well known from the literature that coverage matters much more than union density in determining wages.
As a …rst exercise, we regress one by one di¤erent measures of wage cuts taken from Tab. 5 on each institutional variable, controlling for in ‡ation, growth, change in unemployment and unemployment in the starting period. Only institutional variables turn out to be signi…cant. In ‡ation, unemployment and growth rates do not seem to play a role in explaining cross-countries nominal wage ‡exibility, probably because these measures are highly corre-lated across countries. The measure of wages more correlated to institutional variables turns out to be the percentage of hourly earnings cuts (wcuts).
Since in the theoretical literature a U-shaped relationship between performance and centralization/coordination of bargaining emerges as an implication of rational behavior of unions and …rm 15 , we consider the following general speci…cation for our baseline equation:
allowing for squared terms of both centralization and coordination. Holden (2001) analyses the relationship between downward wage rigidity and epl and coverage predicting a negative sign for both. Considering all the institutional variables together, data for Luxemburg and Greece are lost completely, because a measure of coordination is not available for these two countries. Since for Austria we have only one observation, the number of observations we work with is 19.
Testing for a U-shaped relationship between wage cuts and the degree of centralization and coordination of bargaining boils down to testing whether the derivatives of the model above have the correct sign. The …rst derivative for wcuts with respect to centralization is equal to¯2 +2¯3 (centralization) and the second derivative is 2¯3: For wcuts to be U-shaped in centralization, we need the second derivative to be positive and the …rst derivative to be negative for smaller values and positive for larger values of centralization: This corresponds to having¯3 positive and¯2 negative. Analogously, in order to observe a U-shaped relationship between wcuts and coordination, we need¯5 positive and¯4 negative.
As we can see from Tab.7, when we use the measure of centralization taken from Nickell and Layard (1999) the signs of¯3 and¯5 are positive, whereas taken from Boeri, Brugiavini and Calmfors (2001), but in this case the coef…cient of coordination becomes not signi…cant. In contrast the OECD (1997) measure of centralization, does not seem to have any explanatory power.
The coe¢cient on the percentage of employees covered by collective agreement is a signi…cantly di¤erent from zero parameter in the …rst and third regression, but its sign is positive, contrary to what predicted by Holden (2001) . Therefore, the highest is the coverage of collective agreement, the highest is the frequency of wage cuts.
The strictness of employment protection legislation instead does not seem to be correlated with wage cuts, although the negative sign would be the one predicted by Holden (2001) . [dire ] In the last columns of Tab. 7 we report the results of the same regressions when the dependent variable is hours cuts and not hourly earnings cuts. Since we do not observe hourly wages but earnings divided by the number of hours, it is interesting to investigate the impact of institutions also on hours ‡exibility. As we can see, whereas the relationship between coordination and hours cuts is U-shaped, the relationship between centralization and hours cuts becomes hump-shaped. The coe¢cients on EPL and PCOV1 are not signi…cant. Therefore, in both decentralized and centralized economies hourly earnings are ‡exible, but hours are rigid whereas in countries where the level of bargaining is intermediate hourly earnings are rigid but the number of hours worked are more likely to decrease.
Obviously, due to the measure used (net wages, that can be sensitive to individual taxes changing over time), and to the small number of waves available for each country, the above results are only temptative at this stage.
Conclusions
In this paper we investigated wage dynamics at individual level using the 1994-96 data from the ECHP survey. The particular feature of this new panel data set is that the same questionnaire is asked in all the countries involved in the survey. This allowed us to compare nominal wage changes distributions for stayers full-time in twelve European countries. Moreover, since the ECHP is for many aspects similar to the PSID survey, we could include in our comparisons also the US, where a number of similar works have been carried out using the PSID.
Although in all the countries considered we found on average a quite high degree of nominal wage rigidity, wage cuts are frequent in all the European countries. Moreover, we found interesting di¤erences across countries in the extent of the spike at zero wage changes and the percentages of wage cuts. These di¤erences seem to re ‡ect di¤erences in institutional settings across the European countries. We analyzed the relationship between nominal wage cuts, the structure of bargaining and other labor market institutions in Europe, …nding that the percentage of employees covered by trade unions collective agreements has a positive impact on wage changes, whereas centralization and coordination of bargaining have a U-shaped relationship with wage cuts. Therefore wages are more ‡exible in countries where bargaining is centralized and decentralized then in countries where the level of bargaining is intermediate.
The contributions of the paper to the literature are the following:
² we extend the existing empirical evidence on wage changes distributions at micro-level to 12 European countries, giving a detailed description of the above distributions from a new data-set ² for the …rst time, we compare wage changes distributions across countries under one unique framework ² we construct a panel data on wage changes at individual level that allows comparisons across countries ² whereas most of the existing literature focuses on the impact of in ‡ation on wage rigidity, we consider the role of institutions on the extent of nominal wage ‡exibility observed in the European countries, giving possible explanations for the frequencies of wage cuts observed.
Although a detailed, descriptive analysis is necessary when working with a new data-set such as the ECHP, this is only a …rst step in studying the extent of wage rigidity across the European countries. Our results in fact are only preliminary, since the measure of wages available can be subject to important measurement errors, due to: 1) reporting errors and changes of taxes. Moreover, the number of years for each country are only three, therefore our regression analysis is only temptative. After describing and comparing wage changes distributions across countries, our further research is going in the direction of estimating the extent of nominal wage rigidity taking into account measurement errors in our survey-data. The starting point will be Altonji and Deveroux (2000)'s structural model, used for very similar types of data.
The results of the descriptive analysis given in this paper suggest that, if for the US and Switzerland it was possible to ignore the role of trade unions when estimating Altonji and Deveroux (2000)'s model, we clearly have to take into account the role of the institutions on the labor market when working with European data.
Appendix
It might be argued that considering a change in current earnings as the basemeasure for wage, the results presented in our paper can be biased by the month in which the interview was taken. In this Appendix, we replicate the data set constructed in Section 3, Tab. 5, comparing employees whose interview was taken in di¤erent months of the year to employees who were interviewed in no more than two months di¤erence in the two years period considered.
We do not eliminate from the sample employees whose number of days of absence from work was di¤erent from zero, therefore the number of stayers full-time who took the interview in di¤erent months of the year is slightly bigger than in the tables given in Section 3. The comparison between the tables in Section 3 and the ones in this Section is therefore useful in order to see the impact of correcting for the days of absence from work on our data-set.
Tab. 8 shows the composition of stayers for contract characteristics in two subsamples of employees changing or not changing the month of the interview. As we can see, the percentage of stayers full-time does not change. Tables 9, 10 and 11 compare di¤erent measure of wages for the above subsamples showing that, except for Luxemburg in which the number of observations drops dramatically, the qualitative results do not change at all. The frequencies change only slightly. Therefore, there is no loss of information in considering the more numerous sample for constructing our data set. 1 Source OECD (1997), Table 3 .3, Centralisation, column 17 (1994).
Tab. 1 Composition of stayers by contract characteristics

Source Boeri Briguavini Calmfors (2001).
3 Source Nickell and Layard (1999), Table 7 , column (5).
4 Source OECD (1997), Table 3 .3, Co-ordination, column 23 (1994).
5 Source OECD (1997), Table 3 .3, Bargaining coverage, percentages, column 11(1994).
6 Source Cesifo Forum (2001), Collective bargaining coverage, percentages, (1995).
7 Our elaboration from COV and COV1.
8 Source OECD (1999), Table 2 .5 Overall EPL strictness, version1 (average of indicators for regular contracts and temporary contracts), late 1990s. 
Tab.7 Regressions
